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Fighting VAT Fraud: The Bulgarian Experience 
Abstract: This paper draws on the experience of Bulgaria in identifying the types and modus operandi of 
VAT frauds with a focus on the abuse of tax credit. It analyses the elements of tax design permissive of 
such abuses and discusses the possible solutions in the light of the international and domestic experience 
and the capacity of the tax administration. It offers a critical analysis of the Bulgarian anti-fraud device the 
VAT account, as well as the various alternative policy and administrative measures proposed or applied as 
barriers to abuse of VAT credit, including those pertaining to the domain of commercial registration, or 
those related to indicative “market” prices of commercial transactions. The study concludes that the 
possible solutions should be sought along the lines of optimizing risk management and the principle of joint 
liability rather than through tighter controls at entry and on the conduct of business. 
 
JEL: E26, H26, K34, K42 
 
Противодействие на измамите с ДДС: Опитът на 
България 
Анализират се механизмите на ДДС измамите като се акцентира върху злоупотребите с правото на 
данъчен кредит. На основата на натрупания международен и български опит са разгледани 
нормативните и административни предпоставки за данъчни измами в нашето законодателство и 
възможните решения на проблема. Прави се критичен анализ на опита с ДДС сметката и различните 
предложения за мерки на данъчната политика и администрация, включително по отношение на 
затягане на директния контрол върху регистрациите и прехвърлянията, и върху сделките. Защитава 
се идеята, че решението трябва да се търси по-скоро в оптимизирането на системата за управление 
на риска и принципа на солидарната отговорност, отколкото в затягане на контрола върху 
стартирането и воденето на търговска дейност. 
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Introduction 
VAT fraud is the leading single challenge encountered by the Bulgarian revenue 
administration on the doorway to enlarged Europe. The elimination of border controls on 
the flow of goods and the expansion of trade in services as well as of e-commerce 
complicate the administration of VAT in intra-community trade. Furthermore the 
introduction of the principle of voluntary VAT registration below the compulsory 
threshold in 2006 increases the scope of risk management. With the accession to the EU 
VAT frauds cease to be domestic problem only and incur losses for the Union. Tax effort 
becomes much more international than before as VAT collection in one member-state 
depends on the administrative efficiency of tax auditors in the trading partners’ country 
as well. Risk management and selection of audits requires much closer cross-border 
integration and cooperation between member states at all levels of law enforcement.  
European Commission’s estimates of the size of the losses from VAT fraud point 
at about EUR 60 billion. The losses of Germany alone may account for about one third of 
that figure. Estimates for 2004 point at EUR 17,6 billion. Estimates by the UK statistical 
office show that the scale of fiscal losses there might have more than doubled in the last 2 
years from GBP 1,1 -1,9 billion in 2004-2005 to about GBP 5 billion in the last fiscal 
year and can hit GBP 7 billion in the current fiscal year.2 Against this background 
Bulgarian official figures of up to EUR 300 million a year appear modest in absolute 
terms. They however are about 4-5 times higher than the UK figure if taken as a 
percentage of overall VAT revenues.  
The European Union is trying hard to work out a “coherent strategy” to combat 
VAT fraud. Two years ago the EC recommended that countermeasures are sought within 
the framework of the existing VAT design and pushed forth increased integration of the 
revenue administrations.3 Today, EcoFin suggests more radical measures that may 
change the very fundaments on which the VAT has operated in the last four decades. It 
backed the introduction of the so called “reverse charge mechanism” in regard to the 
riskiest goods such as mobile phones and computer chips and decided to work a directive 
allowing its broader use by member states.4  
Drawing on the VAT literature and the international experience, this paper studies 
the modus operandi of VAT frauds by putting the emphasis on the abuse of tax credit. It 
analyses the impact of the countermeasures applied so far and the advantages and 
disadvantages of the new countermeasures which are currently in the focus of the 
European debate. Section one reviews the mechanics of fraudulent drain schemes. 
Section two studies the Bulgarian anti-fraud device, the VAT account. Section three 
discusses the pros and cons of the various barriers to the abuse of tax credit applied or 
proposed so far, including the replacement of the credit mechanism by the reverse charge 
system. Paragraph one looks into the challenges of the single market to the administration 
of the VAT. Paragraph two examines the cost and benefits of replacing the credit 
                                                 
2 The Guardian, May 9, 2006  
3 Commission of the European Communities, “Report from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on the use of administrative cooperation arrangements in the fight against VAT 
fraud”, Brussels 16.04.2004 COM(2004) 260. 
4 Council of the European Union, Economic and Financial Affairs, Press release, June 7, 2006, 9831/06 
(Presse 154) 
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mechanism. Paragraph three studies some conventional barriers related to the control of 
business registration and the prices of the transactions. The last paragraph in this section 
studies the principle of joint and several liability. The last section concludes.  
The mechanics of organized fraud 
VAT fraud is usually interpreted in two broad categories. One includes various 
techniques of conventional tax evasion. This implies hiding of taxable receipts coming 
from the production and distribution of real products and services. Sales are not recorded 
in the books, or are recorded at lower than actual prices and/or quantities. Alternatively, 
conventional evasion may be effected through overvaluing of spending on inputs. Both 
aim at reducing the tax liability stemming from real transactions. The second category 
includes methods of abuse of tax return through fictitious transactions and traders. It 
implies a net cash outflow from the Treasury which is usually a result of multistage paper 
transactions between accomplices. 
The distinction between VAT evasion (i.e. hiding of tax liability) and siphoning 
of VAT credit may seem elusive and a matter of scale rather than content. In the final 
account it is the magnitude of the fraud that determines whether the fraudster will end up 
with net cash inflow from the Treasury. Therefore for the purpose of this paper the 
distinction is rather between individual evasion through hiding of net revenues from real 
transactions on one hand; and organized abuse of tax credit through fraudulent networks 
based on fake transactions and traders. The crime network includes not only real and fake 
companies, but depends crucially as well on the collusion by tax auditors, customs 
officers and other law-enforcement authorities. This makes network tax fraud a type of 
organized crime rather than tax evasion. Consequently combating it requires a different 
set of instruments and skills and close cross-border cooperation in investigation and 
prosecution. 
The most common international instruments of abuse of the right to VAT credit 
are fictitious export and the missing (insolvent) trader fraud. In the case of fake exports, 
the exporter carries the transaction on paper, applying the zero VAT rate on exports and 
claiming tax credit on the inputs, while actually selling the products on the domestic 
market without sales invoices, i.e. without paying VAT. A safer version would use real 
exports, but would overstate the quantities exported. The scheme’s success depends on 
the co-operation of a customs officer, who processes the paperwork on the export 
transaction. But it may not imply accomplices at the higher level of the customs 
administration, or in the tax audit unit. In its basic versions it does not necessarily depend 
on the complicity of traders up the supply chain, or high level customs officers and it may 
not even include tax auditors. It may rely on random bribery rather than structured 
network. Therefore a fictitious export is more of a border type fraud between individual 
evasion and network abuse of credit. 
The replacement of physical border control with the VIES system in intra-
community trade eliminates the necessity of customs officer in the fraudsters’ network 
and makes this fraud an instrument in the missing trader fraud rather than stand-alone 
scheme. Upon accession, Bulgaria however becomes the land and the sea border of the 
EU in regard to Turkey, the Western Balkans, Russia and the Asian cargos via Russia and 
Turkey, which will increase the relative weight of this type abuse of tax credit.  
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A more structured type of network fraud is the missing trader fraud. It uses a 
chain of paper transactions at prices deviating from the market ones. This leads to 
accumulation of a large portion of the VAT liability in a phantom undertaking, thereby 
making it uncollectible. However, for actual cash to flow out of the Treasury to the 
fraudsters the chain must end with a zero-rate trader. Therefore the scheme is operational 
usually with an exporter at the end of the chain. Even in case exports are real, the value of 
inputs is so inflated that it entitles the exporter to a large refund. The illegal refund of the 
VAT credit flows to a “legal” real exporter before the tax office discovers that there is a 
missing trader up the chain. Thus, the “collected” on documents tax on the inflated inputs 
is never paid to the Treasury.  
A Bulgarian version of the missing trader fraud is the insolvent trader fraud. 
Instead of using a missing trader, which is easier to detect before the refund is completed, 
this version uses existing firm, but before the tax collector reaches it, it is already 
transferred to indigent or half-literate individuals without any assets. 
Most often the missing/insolvent trader fraud is implemented through repeated 
rounds of cross border transactions known as carousel fraud. This, on the one hand, 
makes tracking and countering it more difficult and slow, while on the other, it multiplies 
the cash return on the missing-trader fraud. A simplified numeric illustration is provided 
below (fig. 1) with the assumption of VAT rate of 20 per cent on each side of the border. 
In this example VAT trader A spends EUR100 on inputs from non-VAT supplier, 
adds value worth EUR10 and sells to B at the price of EUR 110 levying a VAT of EUR 
22, which it transfers to the tax office. Supplier B exports the good by levying 0 rate 
VAT on the value added by him (EUR 10) and claiming back from the tax collector the 
taxes paid on inputs (EUR22). The good crosses the border without the tax of the origin 
country in the price. It is worth 120, which is exactly the value added at the three stages 
of the supply chain in the country of origin. The importer in the country of destination 
pays VAT on the value of the imports plus the value added by him, a total of EUR 26. 
After crossing the border the supply chain goes through a number of fictitious and buffer 
transactions, whose effect is twofold. First, they inflate the value added by the 
prospective missing trader (D), which allows the rebate of the tax credit by the organizer. 
Second, they make the connection between the fake and the real players (C and F) hard to 
prove. Traders between the missing trader and the zero-rate player may be compliant 
taxpayers as their compliance is needed for the flawless drawing of the tax credit by F. In 
result, the missing trader enters in the account a payment of EUR 130 on inputs to VAT 
suppliers plus VAT payment of EUR 26 and adds value through labour inputs, or 
supplies from non-VAT traders worth EUR500. As the goods continue around the 
carousel to E, it generates a tax liability for D in the amount of EUR 100 (20 percent on 
the value added of EUR500). Supplier E duly pays to the Treasury the liability on the 
value added by him and passes the goods to the zero-rate trader, who completes the round 
by drawing the tax credit of EUR 128 paid on inputs. The net cash flow to the network 
from the first round (unbroken line) is EUR 100, but the same goods are worth after the 
first round EUR 650, i.e. six times more. Thus the effect of the second turnaround (dotted 
line) is several times higher. The scheme’s capacity is considerable, especially if 
fictitious traders are involved on both sides of the border. Summing up the carousel fraud 
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makes detection difficult across borders and jurisdictions, while at the same time 
multiplying the return on the scam. 
Figure 1. International Carousel Fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Bulgarian experience: The VAT account 
The problem with organized VAT fraud is relatively new for Bulgaria. The tax 
was introduced in 1994 but fraudulent refund schemes only started to spread after 1997, 
when the introduction of the currency board reduced inflation. Prior to that, the long 
time-limits for credit refunds and the high rate of inflation rendered such schemes 
unprofitable. The second half of the 1990s also saw the first high-profile cases of VAT 
fraud. Major countermeasures had not been introduced until 1999 – 2000. Those 
included: closing some of the loopholes in the legal framework; streamlining the large 
taxpayers unit; restructuring the tax audit area to account for the abuse of credit; 
establishing special anti-fraud units; monitoring of VAT losses; etc. 
According to tax authorities in Bulgaria, the detected fraud under the Value 
Added Tax Act (VATA) over the 2000–2004 period, amounts to an annual average of 
BGN 280-300 million (10-12 per cent of VAT revenue collected)5. The actual loss, 
                                                 
5 Доклад на Временната анкетна комисия за разследване на измамите с ДДС към 39-ото Народно 
събрание, 2005 [ Report of the 39th National Assembly’s Temporary Committee of Inquiry into VAT 
Fraud, 2005] 
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according to the administration’s own estimates, is two to four times bigger, i.e. between 
BGN 600-1,200 million (20-45 per cent of VAT revenues). International estimates have 
been sporadic. The Canadian consultant SG Group estimates the evaded VAT in 1999 
and 2000 at BGN 605 million (31.5% of VAT revenue collected) and BGN 454 million 
(19.4%) respectively.6 According to World Bank estimates, VAT compliance gap in 2002 
is about BGN 900 million (33 per cent of VAT revenues).7 In absolute terms, the size of 
the problem may look small by international standards. The losses of the UK Treasury 
amount to about GBP 5 billion, while those of Germany to about EUR 17,6 billion. In 
terms of compliance gap, however, i.e. the size of the loss as a percent of VAT revenue, 
Bulgaria’s leakages are much higher than those of the other EU countries. The UK losses 
for instance amount to less than 7 percent of the VAT revenues, while in Bulgaria the gap 
is 4-5 times larger.  
Like most modern tax systems, the Bulgarian legislation has placed a number of 
obstacles to the abuse of tax credit. Firstly, rather than being immediately refunded, the 
VAT credit is deducted from the tax liability during the following three reporting periods. 
Only after that, is any remainder of tax credit, not so deducted, refunded within 45 days. 
This arrangement is designed to allow bona fide traders to deduct credit from real 
liabilities. It is only exporters that are entitled to priority refund within 30 days in order to 
avoid liquidity constraints. Therefore organized VAT fraud schemes are mostly export-
related frauds and cannot be accomplished without the complicity of customs officers. 
Secondly, actual cash is only refunded after a tax audit, and during the audit, the statutory 
time-limit is suspended. Finally, the principle of joint liability is the last barrier to abuse 
of VAT credit. It was introduced by the Code of Tax Procedure (CTP), in force since 
2000. Under its provisions (article 109), the administration could deny a tax refund if any 
trader in the supply chain has not paid the tax as due. In practice, this meant that, without 
having proof of any relatedness between the refund claimant and the non-compliant 
trader, the administration would anyway penalise the former. However, a number of 
cases brought by taxpayers have gone against the tax authority. In 2002, these provisions 
in the CTP Article 109 were repealed. The principle of joint liability remained embodied 
in VATA (Article 65(4)), but was considerably mitigated by the introduction in the same 
year of the new anti-fraud device - the VAT account. 
Since 2003 all VAT-registered businesses are required to open a VAT account. It 
can be used only for incoming and outgoing VAT payments, thus separating VAT 
moneys from the undertaking’s other cash flows so as to ensure their safe passage to the 
Treasury. Any tax amount above BGN 1,000 must be paid to a VAT account. This 
threshold corresponds to the limit for cash payments of BGL 5000. Thus the VAT 
account was meant as a device to fight the missing trader fraud by virtually extending the 
control of the Treasury on the VAT balances of the firm irrespective of the actual tax 
payment (i.e. before and after the pay day).  
                                                 
6 SG Group Consultants (2002) “Study of Taxpayer Compliance and Law Enforcement”, 
Final Report, June 28, mimeo. 
7 World Bank (2003), “Project appraisal document on a proposed loan in the amount of EUR 31.9 million 
to the Republic of Bulgaria for a Revenue Administration Reform Project”, Report No: 25010-BUL, May 9 
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In return, compliant users of VAT accounts receive two kinds of relief with regard 
to the triple security arrangement outlined above. Traders, which pay to the VAT account 
not less than 80 per cent of the VAT charged to them (i.e. have at least 80 percent of the 
cash flow going though bank transfers), are entitled to a refund within 45 days from filing 
a VAT return. Even if a tax audit is ordered (in the tax authority’s discretion), this time-
limit will not be suspended. Thus, under the VAT account arrangement, the requirement 
to deduct a tax credit from subsequent VAT liabilities, before any remainder can be 
refunded, is dropped, together with the requirement for a tax audit, and the waiting time 
for a refund is limited to 45 days, including the duration of any discretionary tax audit. 
The second advantage has to do with the joint liability principle. The provisions of 
VATA Article 65(4), which prevent refunds if any trader in the supply chain is non-
compliant, do not apply if the subject payment has been made to a VAT account by the 
end of the reporting period for which a tax credit has been claimed (VATA, article 65(8). 
Summing up, the VAT account was designed to counter the missing trader fraud, 
providing at the same time relief to compliant taxpayers caught in the trap of joint 
liability. Only a year after its introduction its performance on both accounts fell short of 
the expectations. Firstly, it failed to raise an effective barrier against organized fraud. 
Missing-trader networks found a relatively easy way to draw down the VAT account f the 
missing trader, taking at the same time advantage of the shelter against the joint liability 
principle provided by the VAT account. The upgraded version of the missing trader 
fraud, dubbed X-type VAT fraud, includes a supply “sub-chain”, whose purpose is to 
draw down the liability of the missing trader from his VAT account. A basic scenario is 
illustrated on figure 2.  
Figure 2. X-type VAT Fraud 
 
The initial (primary) good comes from a non-VAT-registered trader (A) to a 
VAT-registered purchaser/supplier (B) at a VAT-exempt price. The latter acts as a decoy: 
its task is to ensure the right to VAT refund to the organiser (O), as O pays the tax into 
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B’s VAT account. However B’s tax liability will not be collectible—when it is 
established, B will have no balance left on its VAT account. B’s account is drawn down 
by purchases from another supplier (C) and the transfer of the VAT on them to its VAT 
account. On paper, B receives auxiliary fast moving consumer goods which, it sells to 
cash-buyers (CB). These are either end consumers or non-VAT-registered traders or 
VAT-registered traders whose tax liability is below BGN 1,000. The idea is to avoid 
payment of the VAT charged on these sales into B’s VAT account. In summary then, the 
VAT payable on the primary supply is refunded to the scheme organiser, having been 
simultaneously withdrawn from its supplier’s VAT account. In the meantime, it has also 
been used to legalise the auxiliary sales. Therefore, in its basic variety, the X-scheme is a 
method of VAT evasion, rather than unlawful refund. But it is possible to double, at least, 
its effect if the organiser (O), instead of selling the primary goods on the domestic 
market, and reporting the sales, exports them fictitiously and sells them domestically for 
unregistered cash, or else, exports them genuinely but at a lower reported value. In 
addition, the basic chain could be made much longer and more complicated, with the 
involvement of a number of witting or unwitting intermediaries, so as to make it difficult 
to trace and break. Table 1 provides numeric illustration of these two scenarios. 
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Table 1. Financial return on the x-type VAT fraud: evasion vs. leaking 
(a) Non-VAT-Registered Supplier A delivers goods worth 1,000 to Intermediary/Decoy B. The 
supply is VAT-exempt. 
(b) Supplier B adds value of 100 and resells the goods to Scheme Organiser O at 1,320 gross, of 
which 220 goes to B’s VAT account. Thereby, O is entitled to claim a tax credit of 220. 
(c) B draws down its VAT account by transferring 220 to C’s VAT account in respect of goods 
(rapidly marketable) purchased from it at 1,100 net. 
(d) The goods purchased from C are rapidly placed on the cash market, the VAT on them going 
straight into the organisers’ pockets. 
Evasion Scenario 
(220 of budget revenue lost) 
Unlawful Refund Scenario 
(440 + of budget revenue lost) 
(e) Scheme Organiser O sells 
the primary goods on the 
domestic market, charging 
VAT of 220, which it does 
not pay as it is exactly 
offset by its tax credit. The 
net result is that, being 
owed VAT of 440 (220 on 
the primary supply and as 
much on the auxiliary 
supply), the Treasury only 
gets 220—from C’s VAT 
account in respect of the 
auxiliary supply. 
(e) Scheme Organiser O exports the primary goods, charges the 
zero VAT rate on the export transaction, and receives a cash 
refund of 220 in respect of its tax credit. The net result is that, 
being owed VAT of 440 (220 on the primary supply and as 
much on the auxiliary supply), they Treasury gets naught. The 
220 it does receive from C’s VAT account in respect of the 
auxiliary supply is exactly offset by the cash refund in respect 
of O’s exports. Or— 
(f) Scheme Organiser O exports the primary goods on paper, 
charges the zero VAT rate on the export transaction, and 
receives a cash refund of 220 in respect of its tax credit, while 
in reality, it adds value of, say, 500 and sells the goods 
domestically for unregistered cash. The net result is that, being 
owed VAT of 540 (a total of 320 on the two primary supplies 
and 220 on the auxiliary supply), the Treasury gets naught. The 
220 it does receive from C’s VAT account in respect of the 
auxiliary supply is exactly offset by the cash refund in respect 
of O’s exports. Or— 
(g) The same loss effect of 540 is produced if Scheme Organiser O 
has a genuine foreign buyer ready to accept the goods at an 
invoice price lower than the actual one (which a foreign buyer 
might have the incentive to, considering that based on the 
destination rule it would save VAT on imports). In this case, 
Scheme Organiser O avoids the costs and risks of selling the 
primary goods on the domestic unregistered-cash market. 
In brief, the VAT account speeded up the network scam by relieving the missing-
trader fraudsters from the audit requirement rather than providing effective safeguard. 
Furthermore, because of its inefficiency as an anti-fraud device, it failed to guarantee the 
unconditional refund of tax credit to compliant businesses. Administrative practice and 
jurisprudence abound in cases of VAT refund denial, and appeals from it, despite the 
taxpayer’s compliant use of a VAT account. On the other hand the cost of compliance has 
increased because of the effective freezing of companies’ cash flows in the VAT 
accounts.8  
                                                 
8 The VAT account was dropped from the VAT Bill submitted to Parliament by the Council of Ministers in 
the Spring of 2006 (to come into effect in 2007), but the debate in Parliament and outside has not been 
completed yet at the time of writing of this paper.  
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In search of antifraud instruments 
The challenge of the single market 
Fighting VAT fraud is the single gravest accession challenge to Bulgarian tax and 
customs administrations. Its gravity comes from the need to find effective fraud 
deterrents at the least cost of restrictions on bona fide businesses. Striking this balance is 
not easy. The problem is that, more often than not, deterrents are successfully 
circumvented by fraudsters and their accomplices in the audit units, while compliant 
undertakings incur additional costs on account of them. If the tax authority can deny 
VAT credit on the mere suspicion of involvement in a fraudulent scheme, this can open 
the door to corruption and incur additional losses to compliant traders. Conversely, if 
solid proof is required in all cases before the tax administration can take appropriate 
countermeasures, this is likely to tie its hands and place it in a catching-up position, while 
offenders would walk away unpunished.  
After accession to the EU, the risks and difficulties related to VAT administration 
will increase for two reasons. Firstly, as Bulgaria goes further in allowing VAT 
registration under the threshold for compulsory registration, this would make the VAT 
status within reach for any small or start-up undertaking. In the past a missing trader 
scheme needed initial high-value paper transactions to reach the threshold of EUR 25000, 
which raised the probability of detection.9 As voluntary registrations below the thresholds 
grow in number, so will the cost of control and audit preventing missing trader frauds. 
This argument is especially valid in an administration which relies on pervasive auditing 
rather than on effective risk assessment. In addition, the expansion of the VAT system to 
cover small undertakings will increase the economic cost of the administration’s 
ineffectiveness (from wilful or accidental errors and omissions, bribe seeking, etc.). As a 
rule, smaller undertakings have relatively limited capabilities of putting up a defence 
against administrative extortion. 
Secondly, the abolition of customs borders between Bulgaria and the other 
member states will do away with the border control of trade flows, removing the customs 
barriers to cross-border fraud. Of course, the problem is not exceptional to Bulgaria. By 
its structure, VAT is a central tax. Its local application - across tax jurisdictions of 
different tax rates and given the unlimited freedom of movement of goods, persons, and 
capital - is very difficult. The best solution in such a union is to apply the origin principle 
of VAT, i.e., tax the exports at the rate applicable in the country of origin and allow the 
importer to claim tax credit from its tax jurisdiction in respect of the tax paid to the 
exporter. In other words, under this arrangement, the good is taxed as if it does not cross 
the border. It actually does however, and the result is that the tax is paid to the country of 
origin, while the credit is refunded by the country of destination. If the purpose of the 
VAT is to tax consumption rather than production, there must be some mechanism that 
the destination country could claim the credit paid from the country of origin. Therefore 
the operation of the origin principle in the intra-community trade hinges crucially on the 
smooth operation of a multilateral clearing system, by which the member states can settle 
                                                 
9 2006 amendments of VATA allowed optional registration upon reaching a minimum turnover threshold 
of EUR 12500. 
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mutual VAT claims. Such an arrangement, however, is yet to come. It requires a high 
degree of rates harmonisation among the participating countries and the operational 
integration of their respective tax administrations. If it becomes a reality, a country’s tax 
revenues will depend heavily on the level of operational interaction between its tax 
authorities and their counterparts across the border, as well as on their professionalism 
and integrity. Any large disparities of administrative capacity, including levels of 
corruption, would result in material discrepancies between declared volumes of import 
and export, which would in turn disrupt the operation of the international settlement 
mechanism. This was the reason why a transitional VAT arrangement for intra-
community supplies was introduced at the launch of the Single Market in 1993. The 
transitional arrangement retains the destination principle: exports are subject to a zero 
VAT rate, and imports, to the VAT rate in the country of destination. In the absence of 
border control however, this broadens the opportunities for unlawful VAT refunds by 
cross-border supplies and missing traders. Their prevention depends primarily on the 
level of operational interaction between the tax authorities. 
Therefore, Bulgaria’s EU accession will place heavier and more demanding 
requirements on its tax administration. One certain consequence will be the increase of 
fraud prevention costs, both in the public and in the private sector, without the benefit of 
such certainty as to effectiveness. Thus, to strike the right balance between the positive 
and negative effect of deterrents will become even more difficult. 
Ignoring the technicalities involved in the various organized VAT fraud schemes, 
they involve the use of the right of credit by a zero-rate trader before his accomplice up 
the chain has paid the corresponding tax liability. If the credit system causes such 
problems in compliance and enforcement, then the first policy question to be considered 
is whether or not the modern tax and trade system can do without it? As the argument 
often goes, the biggest economy in the world, the USA, has been doing well without it, 
by taxing consumption at the final phase. Or alternatively, the credit mechanism may be 
suspended only for exports. This is the rationale behind the proposal to the Bulgarian 
Parliament to exempt the inputs to exporters from VAT, so that they would not be able to 
claim credit on them. 
Can the credit mechanism be replaced? 
The advantages of the European VAT are mainly in the multiple-phase taxation of 
consumption. Unlike turnover taxes, which it replaced, it taxes only the value added at 
each stage, thus reducing substantially the cascading effect (i.e. multiple taxation of the 
same base and levying of taxes over taxes.) Furthermore, taxing the value added at each 
stage rather than the cumulative value added at the retail stage, like in the US, has 
important administrative advantages. Multiple phase taxation is believed to be more 
evasion-proof than single-phase taxation as it has in-built barriers against undervaluing of 
sales receipts and overvaluing of purchases. In the case of the common credit-invoice 
VAT the tax liability is calculated by subtracting taxes paid on inputs (the tax credit) 
from taxes collected on sales. If not a final consumer, the buyer has a strong incentive to 
require that the full value of the purchase is registered in the tax invoice, so that s/he can 
credit the tax paid against the tax collected from customers down the line. Even if there is 
exempt supplier or tax evader down the line, the tax is likely to be collected from the next 
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VAT-registered supplier, as s/he would not be able to subtract the credit from his own tax 
liability. Even if the exempt or tax-evading trader is a final supplier, the loss of the 
treasury is limited to the tax due on the value added at this final stage of production, not 
on the whole value of the merchandise. This is not the case under the single-phase final 
sales tax levied in the US for instance, where the obligation to collect and pay the tax 
falls only on the final supplier. If s/he fails to record the sales or receives fake exempt 
certificate from the client, the loss amounts to the full tax and not only to the tax due on 
the last portion of the value added. In most post-communist economies, the final supplier 
is in a best position to evade the tax for two reasons. First, the final consumer rarely 
needs invoice for tax or other purposes; therefore he does not have strong incentive to ask 
for it. Second, the bulk of retail traders belong to the group of the hard-to-tax, where 
inspection and law enforcement is difficult.10 Therefore for a country with large number 
of micro-businesses in the sectors of retail trade and services multiple-phase taxation is a 
better revenue instrument than taxation of sales at the final stage.  
The self-enforcement benefits of the credit-invoice VAT in a country with a large 
share of the hidden economy however, should not be overestimated. In practice it may 
have the opposite effect: i.e. lead to a chain reaction of non-compliance. If invoice is 
undervalued up the supply chain, the buyer may have little choice other than to continue 
the double accounting down the chain unless s/he stands ready to pay the tax owed but 
evaded by the supplier. This may happen in a seller’s market with single or few producers 
or importers when buyers are too weak to impose the rules of the game and cannot 
choose another compliant supplier. It is even more likely to occur when the products of 
exempt sectors like farming are inputs in the beginning of production and distribution 
lines. In this case it is not very likely that the buyer will undervalue sales only to avoid 
the loss of paying someone else’s liabilities. If the reverse behavioral relationship 
between non-compliance and punishment is triggered, the forced non-compliance may 
grow in proportion to justify the risk of detection and penalty caused by supplier’s 
actions. This becomes an especially powerful driver where the size of the penalty is not in 
any clearly fixed proportion to the amount of tax evaded, but is rather left to the 
discretion of the enforcement authority. And this is exactly the case under the existing 
Bulgarian legislation. It is worth noting however, that such a chain reaction, even though 
possible in practice, is easier to prevent through audits and control of the large suppliers 
and taxpayers up the chain. Therefore it does not undermine so much the administrative 
advantages of the credit-invoice type VAT. 
The self-enforcement advantages of the credit type VAT concern mainly the risk 
of tax evasion through hiding of sales or overvaluing of purchases. In the same time, it 
provides much larger opportunities for chain fraud. Moreover, the size of evasion through 
concealing of sales receipts or overvaluing of input purchases is limited to the size of the 
value added at each stage of the supply chain and is easier to track as it usually applies to 
actual transactions. In the VAT network frauds with fictitious traders and transactions the 
size of the fraud is virtually unlimited and much harder to track down and prove due to 
lack of real flow of goods. Therefore the credit mechanism is often regarded as the 
Achilles’ heel of the VAT. Further to its vulnerability to individual evasion and organized 
                                                 
10 See Alm, James, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Sally Wallace (Editors), Taxing the Hard to Tax: Lessons 
from Theory and Practice Elsevier, 2004 
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fraud, the credit mechanism is also the biggest challenge to economic efficiency. If it 
does not operate smoothly, i.e. tax refunds are slow and far from guaranteed (which 
depends crucially as well on how fraud-proof it is), then the tax ceases to be a tax on 
consumption alone, but may discourage investment and exports, which generate the 
largest tax refund claims. 
Most of the self-enforcement advantages of multiple-phase taxation can be 
achieved through the alternative subtraction method of taxing value added at each stage 
of the production and distribution process. Тhe tax rate in this case would be applied to 
the difference between the value of total sales and the value of inputs, thus eliminating 
the risk of abuse of tax credit. 11 Each trader down the chain has an incentive to demand 
precise registration of the purchase value in the invoice. Otherwise and unless s/he is in a 
position to transfer down the chain the tax liability evaded by the supplier s/he would be 
liable to pay it. The tax office has a second chance to collect the evaded tax from the next 
registered trader. Furthermore, the subtraction method is a more effective instrument 
against the cascading effect. Under the credit method cascading occurs when non-VAT 
trader is a supplier to VAT customer. This effect is eliminated under the subtraction 
method. The small entrepreneur enjoys the tax advantage not only at the retail stage, but 
also in the position of a subcontractor.12 This alternative however remains more in theory 
than in practice. What makes the tax credit such an indispensable component of the 
design of the modern VAT?  
The credit mechanism is important above all for the international trade and the 
free movement of goods. The taxation of exports and intra-community deliveries is based 
on the destination principle. Deliveries are levied a zero VAT rate, i.e. they are not taxed, 
but the supplier has the right of credit on the taxes paid on inputs. Imports carry the rate 
of the destination country. Therefore exports depend crucially on the smooth functioning 
of the credit mechanism. Furthermore exporters will lose most by the application of the 
subtraction method. They would levy zero rate on the value added by them but would not 
be able to recover the tax paid on inputs. The good would cross the border with the tax 
paid on inputs included in the sales price. The effect is similar to origin-based taxation 
with exemption of exports. In this case, the competitiveness of the goods sold abroad 
depends on the VAT rate in the origin country. A partial solution would be to grant the 
right to credit to the buyer in the destination country. But if the rate there is lower, the 
credit cannot be equal to the taxes actually paid as this would amount to actual outflow of 
tax receipts from the destination to the origin country. Therefore the subtraction method 
is inferior to the credit method in regard to the free movement of goods. In the same line 
of reasoning, the exemption of inputs used by exporters (the proposal to the Bulgarian 
Parliament referred above) will put them in the position of final consumers of those 
goods and will make their products not competitive abroad. More importantly, it will not 
eliminate the risk of abuse of tax credit, but only move it back up the chain. 
                                                 
11 За On the pros and cons of the alternative VAT designs see Ebrill, L. and M. Keen, J-P. Bodin and V. 
Summers The  Modern VAT,IMF, 2001  
12 See more in Пашев, К. Данъчна политика и администрация: теория и практика, УИ Св. Климент 
Охридски, София 2006: 114-115 [ Pashev, K. Tax Policy and Administration: Theory and Practice, Sofia 
University Press, 2006, pp 114-115, in Bulgarian language]  
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Further to its importance for cross-border movement of goods and services, the 
credit mechanism is indispensable for the functioning of domestic transactions as well. 
The subtraction method can do without refund only if the value of sales exceeds the value 
of inputs. It is not uncommon in certain business periods, especially if they are short13, 
the tax collected on outputs to exceed the tax paid on inputs. Tax refunds are 
indispensable in the case of investment spending. The Bulgarian VAT is of the 
consumption type, which means that spending on real assets is subtracted from the VAT 
base, and the taxpayer receives refund on the difference. This implies that in the time of 
spending on machines and equipment, the tax paid to suppliers is likely to exceed the tax 
levied on sales. Therefore the credit is crucial for making the VAT a consumption tax 
rather than a tax on investment.  
Furthermore, the credit mechanism is important if there are multiple VAT rates. 
The EU VAT directive allows the use of two preferential lower rates on certain goods 
and services of an indicative list. 14 Preferential rates on foods and other sensitive goods 
are the norm rather than the exception in most member states. Only Denmark from the 
old members and Slovakia from the new ones have one rate. Differentiated VAT rates are 
the prevailing practice on the Balkans as well. One rate is applied only in Albania, 
Bulgaria and Croatia. 15  
The risks of abuse of tax credit related to the differentiated VAT rates are similar 
to those stemming from the zero rate on exports. Under a standard rate of 20 percent and 
a preferential rate of 5 percent on foodstuff for instance food manufacturers levy 5 
percent on their output, but claim a credit of 20% on their inputs. Unlike exports, 
however, the internal transactions are not a subject of physical border controls and raise 
additional challenges to the revenue administrations. The multiple rates increase the risks 
and incidence of credit frauds. 
The free movement of goods, investment spending and multiple VAT rates in 
Europe make the credit an indispensable part of the VAT design. The size of the VAT 
rebates in advanced and new market economies alike (e.g. the UK, Nederland, Sweden, 
Canada, South Africa, Russia, Hungary) exceeds 40 percent of the gross VAT revenues.16 
Finally, the VAT is one of the most sensitive and advanced areas of tax harmonization 
with direct impact on the basic freedoms on which the EU is based. Radical solutions are 
possible only through broad consensus. In a 2004 special report on the fight against VAT 
                                                 
13 Statutory tax period in Bulgaria is one month 
14 The list includes mainly foodstuff, medicines, water supply, passenger transportation services, books and 
print media accommodation services, use of sports facilities, etc. 
15 Multiple VAT rates for Bulgaria has been in the center of tax policy debate in Bulgaria especially in 
regard to tourist and print sectors and was part of the election campaign of the winners of the 2005 
parliamentary elections, the Bulgarian Socialist Party. On the pros and cons of multiple rates for Bulgaria 
see more in Pashev. K. Corruption and Tax Compliance: Challenges to Tax Policy and Administration, 
Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia 2005 p. 88 
16 International Tax Dialogue, “The Value Added Tax: Experiences and Issues” Background paper prepared 
for the International Tax Dialogue Conference on VAT, Rome, March 15-16, 2005  
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fraud, the European Commission urges the Member States to consider the adoption of 
measures strictly within the existing VAT arrangement.17 
Barriers to the abuse of the right to credit 
The modus operandi outlined in paragraph two shows that organized abuse of 
credit boils down to the accumulation of inflated tax liabilities to a nonexistent or 
insolvent trader. Correspondingly, the focus of antifraud measures falls usually on three 
targets: 
a. to prevent invoicing at fictitious prices 
b. to prevent the entry to the market of fictitious traders 
c. to design a mechanism which would not allow the beneficiary of the 
illegal refund to walk away unpunished 
The illustration of the carousel fraud shows that it relies on invoicing at prices 
which deviate substantially from the prevailing market ones. Undervalued prices of 
inputs and overvalued prices of outputs are applied to inflate the value added by the 
prospective missing trader and the related tax refund to the network. Accordingly, much 
priority is attached to mechanisms to prevent invoicing at fictitious prices. One of the 
anti-fraud measures, proposed by the special Investigative Committee on VAT Fraud in 
the Bulgarian Parliament in 2005 was to allow customs to halt shipments for up to three 
business days if the declared export price deviates from the going market price by more 
than 25 per cent.18 Above all after accession to the EU such a measure may have effect 
only on exports to non-EU countries, as intra-community flows are not subject to border 
control. But more importantly, the use of this method with all its conditionality and 
uncertainty may provide extra room for administrative discretion and corruption pressure 
at the border. Thus, the proposed measure would hardly prove a serious barrier against 
intra-community VAT fraud, but may create opportunities for extortion of bribes from 
exporters to third countries. Therefore market prices (with all reservations on how they 
are determined and by whom) should serve as reference for risk assessment rather than as 
a sufficient evidence for putting transactions on halt. 
A second line of countermeasures targets the legal opportunities for undertakings 
to be registered in the name of, or transferred to, insolvent or nonexistent owners. As 
noted above, after the siphoning of the credit is completed, the hollow company which 
holds the underlying tax liabilities is “sold” to poor and semi-literate people, who receive 
small money for buying huge debts. Countermeasures are usually sought along the lines 
of strengthening controls on the regime of registration and sales of limited liability 
companies. There are several proposals submitted to the Bulgarian Parliament in regard 
to amendments to the relevant sections of the Commercial Code. One is to allow business 
acquisitions only after a proof of absence of outstanding tax liabilities. Furthermore, the 
tax administration has recommended an increase of the minimum authorised capital 
                                                 
17 See Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on the use of administrative cooperation arrangements in the fight against VAT 
fraud, Brussels, 16.04.2004 COM(2004) 260. 
18 Report of the 39th National Assembly’s Temporary Investigative Committee on VAT Fraud, 2005 
proceedings in Bulgarian language 
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required for the incorporation of a limited liability company, so as to narrow the 
opportunities for the involvement in fraudulent schemes of indigent persons posing as 
company owners. Another recommendation is to restrict the right of traders once 
adjudged bankrupt to start or participate in other undertakings. There are such restrictions 
under the Bulgarian Commercial Act regarding sole proprietorships (ET) and joint-stock 
companies (AD), but not in regard to limited liability companies (OOD). The proponents 
of these measures believe that they will raise efficient barriers to insolvent trader fraud.  
The effect of these measures should not be overestimated. A higher capital 
threshold would hardly stop the fraudsters in a scheme that pays back millions of euro 
from creating a hollow company, but certainly would raise a higher barrier to starting-up 
a business by compliant entrepreneurs. Similarly, the statement of tax liability 
outstanding does not provide much assurance: any such liability may not have been 
established yet at the time of ownership transfer but may arise subsequently as a result of 
a tax audit. In this sense it would be more appropriate to provide for a tax audit in the 
event of any change of ownership. 
Joint liability principle 
A more promising line of countering the missing trader fraud is the one related to 
the application of the principle of joint liability. Bulgarian tax administration tried in the 
past an extreme anti-business version of this principle. If there were a missing or non-
compliant trader up the chain the credit would be refused until the claimant is proven 
innocent in court. A lot of appeals by compliant businesses were won in court, and the 
authorities tried to find an alternative solution in the VAT account. A more balanced 
version of the joint liability principle would require that tax credit is denied only if the 
administration has good reasons to believe that the claimant is really involved in the scam 
with the missing trader up the chain, i.e. s/he has known or could not but have known that 
the liabilities underlying the rebate are not paid. Of course it may not be easy for the 
administration to prove a link between a tax credit claimant and a non-compliant taxpayer 
up the supply chain. Furthermore there is still the risk that acting on their own discretion, 
the auditors may use the joint liability principle to extort bribes from compliant 
businesses confronted by the alternative to engage in long and costly litigation of 
uncertain outcome. 
Therefore the first priority in putting the principle of joint liability at work is the 
reduction of the opportunities for its discretionary enforcement. A survey of the 
Bulgarian tax administration finds out that refund of VAT credit is among the tax 
services that are most often accompanied by a bribe.19 Bribes are used not only to hide 
VAT fraud and evasion, but also to receive without delays what might be lawfully due to 
compliant taxpayers. This kind of bribery does not seem to pose well in the context of the 
crime networks discussed here. It may however constitute the initial phase in structuring 
them. Taxpayers and auditors alike may be tempted to increase the return on the risk and 
cost they are taking by this relatively milder form of bribery and go to tax evasion or 
organized fraud. The flawless operation of the rebate mechanism is important for the 
prevention of corrupt interaction between taxpayers and auditors. Despite the decrease of 
                                                 
19 See more in Pashev, Corruption and Tax Compliance …CSD, Sofia 2005, pp. 35-37  
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statutory time limits for the refund of tax credit in Bulgaria, business surveys indicate that 
the average duration is still six weeks in average.20 This opens the door to corruption and 
the establishment of fraudulent VAT schemes. A standard of service that may be used as 
a benchmark for monitoring and assessing of the administrative efficiency in the VAT 
service is an inexpensive measure with much effect for the compliant taxpayers. 
Furthermore, tax auditors should bear personal accountability in the case of a loss of 
administrative or court appeal. This may discourage further the abuse of the principle of 
joint liability for the purpose of extortion of bribes.  
The successful implementation of the principle of joint liability hinges crucially 
as well on the effectiveness of audits. It implies that the audit system is based on 
advanced risk-assessment system. Except for the risk assessment methodology, the major 
pillars of such a system are the unified information system with incentives to companies 
that allow electronic cross-checking of invoices; effective cooperation between revenue 
and crime prevention agencies; assessment of corruption and fraud risks through 
improved individual accountability of auditors and through monitoring of their individual 
performance and effectiveness. None of these have attained yet the level needed for a 
modern risk-assessment system in Bulgaria.  
There might be better alternatives to guaranteeing the receivables than the VAT 
account. Such alternative is to use real assets such as land, buildings and equipment 
owned by the firms as a guarantee of the VAT liabilities of the companies. These will not 
come without cost for the companies, but may not hurt their liquidity so much as the 
VAT account. 
Last but not least, the issue of penalties for organized fraud need also be revisited. 
The existing Criminal Code in Bulgaria does not treat unlawfully claimed VAT refunds 
as a special kind of tax or financial crime. This should change, considering that VAT 
fraud is more akin to organised crime than to conventional tax evasion. A criminal 
liability treating VAT fraud as organized crime should be expressly provided for in the 
legislation. Second, the current administrative penalties in the Bulgarian VAT Law do not 
target illegal refund of VAT credit. They target mainly the conventional tax evasion 
through concealing of sales receipts and registration, reporting and payment non-
compliance. Even those are fixed by the law in broad boundaries with a ceiling, above 
which the marginal penalty rate is zero. This not only leaves large room for 
administrative discretion in regard to the size of the penalty, but encourages also large-
scale fraud. Both the criminal liability code and the administrative liability section of the 
VAT Law should be amended to include organized VAT fraud and the abuse of tax 
credit.  
In conclusion, one-size-fits-all approach may be far from optimal. Some 
businesses are more prone to abuse of tax credit than others and the tax administration 
may treat them differently. Thus the missing trader scam is usually associated with high-
value goods such as mobile phones and computer chips, or the export of farming goods 
and scrap, which can generate sizeable credit claims. The safeguards in these risky 
                                                 
20 “Assessment of Administrative Procedures for Doing Business in Bulgaria” Foreign Investment 
Advisory Service of the IFC and the World Bank, seminar presentation, June 14-15, 2004, Hilton Hotel, 
Sofia 
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sectors may be stronger than in the other export sectors. Such a differentiated approach 
should be based on the output of a modern risk assessment methodology and the 
experience in the EU, and should be developed with the cooperation between law 
enforcing agencies and the respective industry associations of entrepreneurs. Once risk 
profiles are defined by sectors, the appropriate industry associations should be involved 
in the development of preventive measures. Risk assessment audit targeting and 
administrative control needs to be differentiated according to sector taxpayer and product 
characteristics, to maximise the effectiveness of prevention and deterrence. For their part, 
industry associations should also assume greater responsibility for fighting fraud and 
corruption. The business community is best placed to provide input for risk assessment 
and effective countermeasures. Besides, it should see its own interest in cooperating with 
the authorities as this would reduce unfair competition and keep bona fide businesses out 
of the administration’s VAT watch-list and away from the additional administrative 
hassle which being on that list would imply. Of course, even then, there would be 
compliant taxpayers who would have to prove that they did not, or could not, have 
knowledge of any fictitious deals up the supply chain of which they are also part. 
However, such cases should be few and far between.  
Conclusion 
In the four decades of its use in Europe the VAT had turned into a major vehicle 
of fiscal management and free trade. Compliance and enforcement policies have been 
focused so far predominantly on the prevention of conventional tax evasion. Therefore 
the credit-invoice mechanism of self-assessment and payment of tax liabilities has 
become the international standard. The globalisation and especially the establishment of 
the single market in Europe make the VAT vulnerable to the abuse of international 
network fraud. The VAT design is crucial for the fundamental freedoms in the EU: the 
free movement of goods, capital and people. But in its nature it is a central tax and 
operates much better in one tax jurisdictions than across borders. Correspondingly, EU 
tax harmonization in the field of VAT is most advanced. Any changes in its design need 
to be pursued through broad consensus. The overall picture is complicated by the 
unprecedented enlargement of the EU with the accession of 12 new members in 2004-
2007 with broadly varying levels of administrative capacity in handling conventional 
evasion and organized fraud. This poses the difficult question of whether a solution can 
be found within the framework of the current credit mechanism, or more radical 
departure from the established design is needed. 
The credit mechanism is superior as a barrier to conventional tax evasion, but 
makes the tax vulnerable to illegal refunds through missing/insolvent trader fraud. While 
conventional tax evasion may not be such a problem in the old member states, it is still a 
problem in some of the new member states. And this is not just a matter of administrative 
capacity, but also of opportunities for legal tax avoidance, which are much bigger in the 
old members. This makes finding the best solution difficult. One line of countering 
missing trader fraud in the framework of the credit mechanism is based on strengthening 
the barriers to allowing fake businesses and fake transactions. Increased administrative 
controls on the business entry and on transaction prices may increase compliance costs 
for start-up and compliant firms without raising efficient barriers to fraudsters. The 
Bulgarian VAT account is a case in point. It increased much more the cost of voluntary 
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compliance than the cost of organized fraud. In result it could neither reduce network 
fraud, nor provide a relief to compliant traders in regard to the principle of joint liability.  
Despite its bad reputation, the principle of joint liability appears an important 
element of the overall strategy to combat network fraud. Of course it needs to be 
optimized in the direction of more impartial implementation, so that it targets better the 
fraudsters rather than compliant traders that have been caught unwittingly in the 
fraudsters’ network. The principle of joint liability is a serious test of the professionalism 
and integrity of the revenue administration and law enforcement as the market links in 
one chain compliant traders and fraudsters. Therefore it may be applied only through a 
state-of-the-art system of risk management. It needs to identify the risk sectors and goods 
and equip the audit and law enforcing units with the relevant databases on technology 
processes, production capacities, and price calculations. One-size-fits-all approach is far 
from optimal. More radical solutions such as special guarantees on tax liabilities or 
reverse charge system may be applied to such export shipments as cellular phones and 
computer chips, where frauds are most common and costly. 
The cooperation with the business is indispensable in this regard. Traders are in a 
better position than the administration to know what is going on their market and to be 
able to tell the fake from the real suppliers. Still the perceptions among entrepreneurs that 
VAT frauds are a problem of the revenue administration rather than of their sector seem 
to prevail. There must be special incentives for companies in the risky sectors who share 
with the revenue administration their invoice databases and allow cross-checking of 
invoices. In this regard the potential of modern IT are not yet fully utilized in the 
prevention of organized fraud, especially across tax jurisdictions. 
Finally, no perfect system seems to exist that can work the miracle of 
distinguishing easily fraudsters from law-abiding taxpayers and delivering deserved 
punishment on the ones while shielding the others from the tax authorities’ errors of 
judgment. A trade-off is necessary between the interests of business and those of the 
administration, based on a clear understanding of its net benefit. This implies, for tax 
officers, that they should learn to live with the fact that fraudsters are after all the 
exception and not the rule, and also, that they should be ready to accept responsibility and 
liability for their errors and the damage caused by them to compliant taxpayers. As for 
business, it should learn to live with the principle of joint liability and such other 
restrictive measures, especially if it operates in a high-risk sector, as a necessary cost to 
be incurred if VAT fraud is to be reduced and with it, unfair competition and the need for 
higher tax rates. 
 
 
